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This article is designed to provide attorneys representing mining
companies and contractors doing work on mine property with a primer
for dealing with Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA")'
special investigations. MSHA special investigations pose particularly
complex and sensitive problems for company counsel. Such an investi-
gation may give rise not only to increased civil, or even criminal, liability
for the company, but also civil and criminal liability for individual man-
agers.
It is also important to note that, although not addressed separately in
this article, the concepts addressed herein are, in large measure, equally
applicable to accident investigations. MSHA regulations provide that
certain events occurring on mine property including, among other events,
the death of an individual or the injury to an individual "which has a rea-
sonable potential to cause death" are to be immediately reported to
MSHA.2 As one can appreciate, an accident with serious injuries, or a
fatality, is a situation where potential liability is great and these circum-
stances almost always lead to serious citations and a later special investi-
gation.
3
Special investigations are a "preliminary" which may lead to greater
corporate liability, individual managers' civil liability, and, in extreme
circumstances of conscious misconduct, criminal liability for both the
* Member, Sherman and Howard, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado. J.D. Harvard Law School
(1974); B.A. Kansas State University (1970).
1. The Mine Safety and Health Administration is a part of the United States Department of
Labor and is charged with enforcement of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-164 § 302, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 557(a) (1977)).
2. See generally 30 C.F.R. Part 50 (2000). An "accident" is to be immediately reported to
MSHA by telephone. 30 C.F.R. § 50.10. It is then at MSHA's discretion whether or not to conduct
an immediate on-site investigation. Particularly where a fatality or a serious, potentially disabling,
injury has occurred, MSHA virtually always conducts an immediate on-site investigation. The
accident investigation will usually begin the next or second working day after the accident,
depending upon the proximity of MSHA offices to the mine site. 30 C.F.R. § 50.2 (h)(1-12) defines
"accident" as one of twelve discrete events, including ten which do not necessarily involve any
personal injury.
3. It is certainly prudent whenever an incident is immediately reported that company counsel
be involved in assisting mine personnel in dealing with MSHA's accident investigation.
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company and individuals. It is thus essential that mine operators proceed
with great care as to any citation, or accident, which may lead to a spe-
cial investigation.
I. MINE ACT LIABILITY
Liability for violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977 ("the Mine Act")4 can be significant. The Mine Act provides that
each violation of an applicable regulation, or the Mine Act itself, may
lead to a civil penalty against the mine operator.5 The maximum for that
civil penalty is currently $55,000.6 While most citations have proposed
penalties of a few hundred dollars and, on occasion, only $55.00,7 those
citations arising from a fatality, serious injury, or which are found to be
caused by a high degree of negligence or an "unwarrantable failure" will
often be assessed much closer to the maximum allowable penalty.
In addition to mine operator civil liability, the Mine Act also pro-
vides for corporate criminal liability8 and, of particular significance here,
civil and criminal liabilit' for individual directors, officers, or agents of a
corporate mine operator. That liability allows for the same level of pen-
alties against an individual as a corporate operator would face.
For civil liability to attach, a director, officer, or agent of a corporate
mine operator must have "knowingly authorized, ordered, or carried out"
an action or failure to act which would subject the corporate mine op-
erator to a civil penalty.' ° This liability may arise for either a violation of
a mandatory health or safety standard or any other provision of the Mine
Act itself."
In evaluating whether some action has been taken "knowingly,"
MSHA takes the position that it does not have to show "bad faith or evil
4. Mineral Lands and Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq (2000). For an overview of the
Mine Act, see, e.g., Stephan A. Bokat & Horace A. Thompson III, eds., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH LAW, Chapter 26, "The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977" (The Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc. and American Bar Association 1988).
5. 30 U.S.C. § 820(a) (2000).
6. Id. The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, §
535, 104 Stat. 890 (1990), amended by, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title III § 31001(s)(1), 110 Stat. 1321-
373 (1996) and Pub. L. No.105-362, Title XIII, § 1301(a), 112 Stat. 3293 (1998) (allowing for
automatic periodic increases in civil penalties with inflation). Thus, the maximum civil penalty is
presently set at $55,000. See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2000).
7. MSHA Civil Penalty Regulations at 30 C.F.R. Part 100 (2000). See also 30 C.F.R. §
100.4(a) (allowing for a single penalty assessment of $55.00 for minor violations).
8. 30 U.S.C. § 820(d) and (f). It should be noted that by operation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571 and
3581, the maximum criminal fines may be as high as $500,000 for a corporation and $250,000 for an
individual, depending upon the nature of violation involved.
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purpose or criminal intent."' 2 MSHA's position is that the term "know-
ingly" is to be defined as in contract law "where it means knowing or
having reason to know [and that a] person has reason to know when he
has such information as would lead a person exercising reasonable care
to acquire knowledge of the fact in question or to infer its existence."' 3
Nevertheless, cases have consistently included the concept that before
individual civil penalties can be issued, there must be some showing that
the action of a director, officer, or agent of a corporation "involve[d]
aggravated conduct, not ordinary negligence."' 4 Under these cases,
"knowing" conduct must involve more than a lapse in judgment or a loss
in concentration. 5 Nevertheless, because the standard for individual civil
liability encompasses not only what the individual knew but also what
the individual reasonably should have known, caution dictates that
whenever a violation of the Mine Act has been alleged by MSHA and a
special investigation follows, the matter must be treated with the utmost
care and seriousness.
The Mine Act also provides for criminal liability for the operator of
a mine and any director, officer, or agent of a corporate operator where
the mine operator, director, officer, or agent "willfully violates a man-
datory health or safety standard, or knowingly violates or fails or refuses
to comply" with certain orders issued under the Mine Act.'6 Criminal
liability may arise where action occurs which involves "intentional dis-
obedience" or "reckless disregard" of a mandatory health or safety stan-
dard or applicable provisions of the Mine Act. 17 Reckless disregard has
been defined as "closing of the eyes to or deliberate indifference toward"
requirements which the defendant "should have known and had reason to
know" about at the time of the violation.1
8
Whether evaluating the risks of civil or criminal liability, issues of
intent and knowledge are central. Issues of intent usually, and necessar-
ily, involve subjective evaluations. Whenever MSHA seeks to undertake
12. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MSHA HANDBOOK #PH97-
1-3 4-xxxvi (1997). This Handbook is available on MSHA's website at http://www.msha.gov/.
13. Id.
14. E.g. MSHA v. Wyoming Fuel Co., 16 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1618, 1630 (1994)(citing MSHA v.
Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 14 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1232, 1245 (1992)). Accord Freeman United Coal Mining
Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 108 F.3d 358, 363-364 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
15. Id.
16. 30 U.S.C. § 820(d). A violation of a standard is "willful" if done:
[E]ither in intentional disobedience of the standard or in reckless disregard of its
requirements. Reckless disregard means the closing of the eyes to or deliberate
indifference toward the requirements of a mandatory safety standard, which standard the
defendant should have known and had reason to know at the time of the violation. The
term willfully requires an affirmative act either of commission or omission, not merely
the careless omission of a duty.
U.S. v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 789 n.6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984). See also U.S. v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 504 F.2d 1330, 1335 (6th Cir. 1974).
17. See Jones, 735 F.2d at 789.
18. Id.
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a special investigation, it is essential that in-house, or outside, counsel be
involved in evaluating how to proceed. Even though mine management
may feel it acted properly and in good faith, that will not be the.end of
the matter. The issue in a special investigation ultimately boils down to
the conclusion reached by a special investigator and the investigator's
superiors in the MSHA internal review chain as to whether any "know-
ing" or "willful" misconduct has occurred. In such circumstances, it is
valuable, if not critical, that counsel be involved in assisting both the
company and individual managers in the investigation. The investigation
is essentially an adversarial proceeding, or certainly should be treated as
such. Failure to take advantage of assistance of counsel may lead to an
incomplete or misdirected defense of the company and/or an individual's
position.
II. MSHA CRITERIA FOR A SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
MSHA's Special Investigations Procedures Handbook describes
criteria for undertaking a special investigation.19 The "special investiga-
tion" is the mechanism MSHA uses to evaluate whether to propose ex-
traordinary penalties. It is important to note that the Mine Act does not
reference "special investigations," and it contains no criteria for evaluat-
ing whether a special investigation is appropriate. MSHA will make an
initial evaluation as to whether there is some basis for concluding a
"knowing" or "willful" violation may have occurred. If that conclusion is
"yes" or "maybe," a special investigation will follow.
Where there has been a mine accident, a complaint of possible ad-
vance notice of an inspection,2 ° false reporting of information,2' or mis-
representation regarding equipment's compliance with Mine Act re-
quirements,22 the circumstances will be evaluated to determine whether a
special investigation is appropriate.
23
Additionally, other citations issued to a mine operator, independent
of these circumstances, will be evaluated. Particularly those citations.... 24
issued along with an imminent danger closure order, citations desig-
19. Supra note 12, at 4-xxxvii.
20. Giving advance notice of an inspection may also lead to criminal sanctions. 30 U.S.C. §
820(e). Presumably that sanction would only apply to a government agent, not a mining company or
one of its agents.
21. False statements, representations, or certifications may lead to criminal penalties. 30
U.S.C. § 820(f). This may apply to records required to be kept pursuant to MSHA regulations or to
statements made in special investigations, among other things.
22. 30 U.S.C. § 820(h).
23. Supra note 12, at 4-xxxvii.
24. Imminent dangers may lead to an immediate, self-executing closure of the affected area of
the mine. 30 U.S.C. § 817(a) (2000). Only persons needed to correct the danger may enter affected
area. 30 U.S.C. § 817(a), as provided in 30 U.S.C. § 814(c) (2000). "Imminent danger" is defined at
30 U.S.C. § 8020) (2000).
[Vol. 78:3
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nated by an unwarrantable failure, 25 or citations which involve working
in violation of an order of withdrawal 26 will draw specific focus in de-
termining whether a special investigation should occur. While not all of
these citations will lead to a special investigation, increasingly, in recent
years, the norm is for these matters to lead to a special investigation.27
It should also be highlighted that MSHA is not precluded from con-
ducting a special investigation into other alleged violations that fall out-
side these parameters. Moreover, it is not required to conduct a special
investigation of every alleged violation of a mandatory health or safety
standard or other provision of the Mine Act that meets these criteria.
MSHA has a great deal of administrative discretion in determining which
matters it will pursue to a special investigation.
III. THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
A. Early Company Investigation
Where an accident has occurred, and an attorney has participated in
the accident investigation, a thorough factual investigation will be un-
dertaken at the same time as MSHA's initial accident investigation.
However, where the attorney has not participated in the accident investi-
gation or, non-accident events have occurred which may give rise to a
special investigation under MSHA's criteria, it is prudent to undertake an
early factual investigation of the situation. Failure to do so may signifi-
cantly limit the ability to mount a successful defense.
Depending upon the circumstances surrounding the citation and the
availability of mine personnel, this early investigation may be conducted
either through an on-site investigation by the attorney or by telephone in
coordination with safety personnel and mine management. Particularly,
25. The legal standard for an unwarrantable finding has long been set. The Senate Report to
the Mine Act specifically approved a prior decision finding an unwarrantable failure under the
predecessor of the Mine Act, the Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969. See S. Rep. No. 181, at
32, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3432, which cited with approval under Zeigler Coal Co., 84 1. D.
127, 135 (1977), 1 MSHC 1518, 1524 (IBMA No. 74-37, 1977) which stated:
[T]hat an inspector should find that a violation of any mandatory standard was caused by
an unwarrantable failure to comply with such standard if he determines that the operator
involved has failed to abate the conditions or practices constituting such violation,
conditions or practices the operator knew or should have known existed or which it failed
to abate because of lack of'due diligence, or because of indifference or lack of reasonable
care. The inspector's judgment in this regard must be based upon a thorough
investigation and must be reasonable.
Decisions as to an unwarrantable failure necessarily involve multiple fact questions as to the
judgment of supervisory personnel.
26. The Mine Act provides that withdrawal orders may be issued for failure to timely abate a
citation, 30 U.S.C. § 814(b), repetitive, unwarrantable failure violations, 30 U.S.C. § 814(d),
citations following a pattern of violation notice, 30 U.S.C. § 814(e), and for imminent danger
situations, 30 U.S.C. § 817(a). Additionally, untrained miners are to be withdrawn from work until
their training is completed. 30 U.S.C. § 814(g).
27. See MSHA Special Investigation Procedures, supra note 12, at 4-xxxvii-4-xxxix.
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should cost be an issue, or if there are significant uncertainties as to
whether a special investigation might occur, much can be done by tele-
phone. Document collection can readily be coordinated and interviews
can often be conducted by telephone, depending upon the nature of the
situation.
Early investigation and evaluation is important, not only to begin
making judgments as to approaches, but also to ensure information is not
lost. MSHA's internal guidelines allow for at least thirty days for proc-
essing and evaluation as to whether a matter should be pursued for spe-
cial investigation. 28 MSHA's Manual does not specify how soon an in-
vestigation should commence. In recent years, in view of the significant
increase in the number of special investigations, it has been rare, at least
in the western United States, for special investigations (especially in non-
accident situations) to occur less than six months after a citation is is-
sued. Nine to twelve months is probably a more common time period
between issuance of a citation and MSHA's beginning special investiga-
tion interviews of managers. MSHA inspectors will have always made
notes of their evaluation of a situation leading them to issue a citation.
While some managers and safety representatives take notes during the
course of inspections, many do not. Often the notes taken may not neces-
sarily be very detailed. Even if the inspector noted concern about the
situation at the time it was observed, the seriousness of the potential ci-
tation may not have been disclosed until the end of the inspection day, or
perhaps even later. Even a week or two after a citation is issued, memo-
ries will have begun to fade. If fact gathering does not begin for several
months, much information may be lost. Company personnel should have
at least the broad outlines of their defense prepared before MSHA begins
contacting the company or individual managers for interviews, which
29may not occur until months after the citation was issued.
B. Ethical Issues
Since a special investigation necessarily involves not only determi-
nations as to more serious corporate liability, but also decisions as to
managers, ethical issues as to representation will often arise for counsel.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that lawyers not rep-
resent a client if the representation of that client is directly adverse to
another client. 30 Moreover, since a corporate mine operator can only act
28. Supra note 12, at 4-xxxviii.
29. MSHA regulations allow for a conference on citations to discuss the citation and the
company's reasons for reducing the severity of the citations. Federal Mine Safety & Health Act 30
C.F.R. § 100.6(c) (2000). The conference must be requested within 10 days after the citation is
issued: 30 C.F.R. § 100.6(b). Where a conference has occurred, added information will presumably
have been collected. However, that may not necessarily have been done from the perspective of
litigation defense.
30. Colorado Rules of ProflI Conduct R. 1.7(a) (2000).
[Vol. 78:3
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through its directors, officers, and agents a lawyer representing the cor-
poration must carefully evaluate whether s/he can represent not only the
corporation but also individuals.
Generally, counsel will begin this process representing a corporate
client. A lawyer representing a corporate entity is obligated to proceed
"as is reasonably necessary in the best interest" of the corporation in a
situation where an officer, director, or agent is engaged in action that
may give rise to a violation of law that might be attributable to the corpo-
ration.31 Dual representation of directors, officers, or employees/agents is
allowable depending upon the circumstances.3 2 Assuming the situation is
one in which counsel initially becomes involved on behalf of a corporate
entity, it is ethically mandated that a judgment be made, and reevaluated
on a ongoing basis, as to whether the lawyer can represent not only the
corporate entity, but also individuals associated with the corporation.
Determining whether multiple representation of both the corporation
and one or more corporate agents can occur involves a fact intensive
evaluation of a number of issues. Most prominent among these are judg-
ments as to the potential culpability of the corporation, potential culpa-
bility of individual managers, corporate requirements, and allowable
approaches as to indemnification of corporate agents. Additionally,
judgments need to be made as to the potential for civil versus criminal
liability, since it is doubtful that joint representation would ever be un-
dertaken where it was thought there was a serious risk of criminal liabil-
ity.
Other than noting the necessity for this evaluation and the broad re-
quirements of the canons of ethics, no clear guideline can be provided.
Counsel must review the applicable canons of ethics, company policies
and practices, the facts of the particular citation(s), and make a judgment
as to the appropriate approach for handling the particular representation.
Certainly, if the circumstances are such that the corporation is consider-
ing discipline, if not discharge, of a manager involved in the events
leading to the citation(s), joint representation will likely be inappropriate.
In that situation, the corporation will likely be considering, if not pursu-
ing, an argument that corporate negligence should be reduced, and thus
the penalty lessened because of supervisory misconduct. 34 Also, an indi-
31. Colorado Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(b).
32. Colorado Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(e).
33. Colorado Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(a).
34. The efficacy of such an argument will be highly dependent on the facts of the particular
situation. The Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission has ruled that where a mine
operation is (a) prudent in selecting and training a foreman [or other manager], who had in the past
exercised good judgment, and (b) has an adequate overall safety program, then a foreman's acting
"aberrantly" and engaging in "wholly unforeseeable misconduct" will give rise to a defense which, if
proved, can reduce the level of negligence attributable to the mine operator, and, thereby, reduce the
civil penalty. MSHA v. Nacco Mining Co., 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 848, 850 (1981). Recently, the
Commission noted this defense "has been applied sparingly" and it refused to apply Nacco to reduce
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vidual may for his/her personal reasons prefer separate representation
and, depending upon the circumstances and corporate indemnification
policies, the Company may be obligated to finance such a request.
I would also add a personal word regarding multiple representations
based upon my own experience. If an initial decision in favor of joint
representation later proves to be an error, the only "penalty" is that the
lawyer will be obligated to withdraw, both from representing individuals
and from representing the corporation on the particular matter at hand.
There is no loss of privilege to communications occurring prior to the
withdrawal from representation. Where corporate indemnification poli-
cies provide protection for the individual and there is no reason to expect
the corporation may either wish to discipline a manager for actions taken
or omitted or argue that the conduct of an individual officer, director, or
agent was improper and cannot, or should not, be attributed to the corpo-
ration, my preference is to err on the side of joint representation. I say
this even though this approach may later give rise to a necessary with-
draw from all representation on the particular matter.
The reason for this approach is that, even at larger mines, the
workforce tends to be close knit and first line supervisors often identify
closely with their more senior managers and the mining company itself.
If mine supervisors have separate representation from the corporation, it
may ensure that a particular lawyer represents the company throughout
the dispute to its resolution, but it will not necessarily serve the overall
interests of the corporation in,having an effective management team. If
good managers have to find their own independent counsel, even if they
are assisted in that by corporate counsel, it will necessarily foster some
degree of "we" and "they" mentality which will not be productive, long-
term, for the mine. Obviously, where it is known early in an investigation
that a particular manager has engaged in plainly inappropriate conduct,
not only will corporate counsel be unable to represent that individual, the
attorney may also be involved in advising the corporation as to whether
misconduct engaged in by the manager warrants demotion or even termi-
nation from employment. Where, however, as is most often the case, the
worst that may be said about a manager is that a lapse in judgment or
attention led to the circumstance now being specially investigated by
MSHA, the overall interests of the corporation may best be served by
"hanging together" rather than "hanging separately". In assessing the
interests at play and applicable ethical standards, the potential advantages
to the corporate client and its managers in a joint representation should
be carefully evaluated, even if it leads to the lawyer's accepting some
risk that if facts dramatically change, withdrawal from all representation
in the matter at a later date might be required.
the negligence of a mine operator and, thereby, vacate an unwarrantable failure finding. MSHA v.
Capitol Cement Corp., 21 FMSHRC 883, 893-95 (1999).
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Necessarily, judgments as to joint representation should only be con-
sidered by outside counsel. In-house attorneys actively involved in han-
dling special investigations are in a different posture. Rarely, if ever,
would in-house counsel be in a position where s/he would want to un-
dertake representing not only the corporation but also individual officers,
directors, or agents.
C. A Special Investigation Checklist
In preparing for a special investigation, counsel should evaluate a
number of factors both before and during the investigation.
1. Issues of Representation
As described above, ethical issues must be addressed at the outset
and as the matter progresses, in connection with any special investiga-
tion. A continuing evaluation of whether counsel can represent not only
the mining company, but also individual supervisors must occur. It is
also important to determine what representation role counsel will provide
with respect to particular company witnesses. That, of course, will bear
upon issues as to the applicability of attorney-client privilege to commu-
nications that occur in the interview process.
2. Witnesses
Information must be gathered as to the potential witnesses to the al-
leged violation. This may include both management and non-
management employees. Depending upon the issues raised by the cita-
tion(s), it may be appropriate not only to interview personnel accompa-
nying the inspector but also personnel working in the area during the
shift when the citation was issued and personnel who may have worked
in the area on one or more prior shifts. Additionally, where issues of
equipment condition or maintenance are involved, it is likely that the
maintenance personnel last involved with the equipment will have perti-
nent information to supplement the information equipment operators may
have.
As a list of witnesses is developed, interviews should be conducted
to determine what information each witness may have related to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the citation(s) at issue. As a part of this inter-
view process, counsel should also be evaluating whether it will be appro-
priate to undertake representation of one or more individuals. Independ-
ent of representation issues, counsel should advise those witnesses of
their rights vis-A-vis an MSHA special investigator in an interview.35
35. Witnesses are not required to participate in an interview with a special investigator. If a
witness does participate in an interview, it is certainly in the witness' interests to have the assistance
of counsel. Without the assistance of someone familiar with the investigation process, and the
litigation that may follow, the witness may not make a complete or clear defense of the situation.
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It should also be added in regard to witnesses that when an MSHA
special investigator contacts mine management about a special investi-
gation, the investigator may be willing to disclose the names of those
managers the investigator wishes to interview. The investigator will not
disclose non-management interviewees. Moreover, some investigators
will only disclose names of management witnesses after the investigator
has first attempted to contact the company manager to determine whether
the manager is willing to talk to the investigator without the assistance of
counsel, or assistance of some other company representative.
3. Document Gathering
The range of potential documents will obviously depend upon the
nature of the underlying citation. Categories which may be pursued,
however, include (a) notes made by company personnel during the in-
spection leading to the citation, (b) notes made by the manager(s) work-
ing in the area where the citation was issued during the shift when the
citation was issued and, often, prior shifts, (c) pre-shift and on-shift in-
spection records which may have been completed for the area where the
citation arose or equipment in question was located, and (d) maintenance
records for any equipment that may be involved in the citation.
It is critical that once documents are collected, they be retained. In-
dependent of what decisions may be made with regard to personal inter-
views, company records may be subpoenaed if not voluntarily
provided.36
4. Should the Individual Managers Submit to an Interview?
As information is gathered, a decision must be made about whether
to advise a manager to be interviewed. The approach here will depend
both upon the comfort level of the manager and the circumstances. Indi-
vidual managers are not obligated to participate in an interview nor, for
that matter, are hourly employees. A range of factors, including the ap-
parent direction of the investigation, information that the witness may
have, the witness' comfort level with the process, and the anticipated
reaction of MSHA to a refusal to be interviewed, should be considered in
addressing this issue. While not articulated by MSHA, my sense of the
investigation process is that if an individual refuses to participate in an
interview, MSHA will draw a negative inference from that refusal which
may increase the risk of a penalty being proposed. That alone, however,
36. While no survey has been conducted, anecdotal information from discussing these issues
with other practitioners would suggest to the author that most commonly, counsel representing
mining companies, and managers, during special investigations provide the investigator with
company records as requested by the investigator. Different issues as to access may arise in a
situation in -which an individual supervisor is asked to produce any notes which he may have made.
Those issues should be addressed on a case by case basis.
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should not lead a person to participate in an interview. Finally, it should
be added that generally, though not always, if an individual is unwilling
to be interviewed, that should lead to closer consideration of whether
separate representation may be appropriate for that individual.
Before the witness actually meets with the MSHA investigator, the
lawyer should also spend time preparing the witness for the interview.
This will, in large measure, be comparable to preparing a witness for a
deposition or trial testimony. Although this process is in many respects
less formal than deposition or trial testimony, advance preparation of a
witness is just as important before a meeting with a special investigator.
5. Should a Witness Agree to Provide a Written Statement or to be
Tape Recorded?
I always counsel against witnesses agreeing to be tape-recorded. I
have, over my 27 years of practice, heard too many witnesses uninten-
tionally misspeak, whether they misunderstood a question, misheard a
question, or simply misspoke. Where a tape recording is made, unless
counsel knows at the time that a misstatement has been made, no correc-
tion can be made, as a practical matter, and later efforts to make a cor-
rection may be of only marginal utility. If someone misspeaks in the
nervousness of the interview, he should not have a tape recording held
against him.
While the conclusion will vary depending upon the circumstances,
my own view is that if a witness is submitting to an interview, it will
generally also be best to agree to give a written statement. Again, it is
critical to evaluate the particular circumstances before agreeing to give a
written statement. If an interview is conducted, however, utilization of a
written statement ensures the opportunity to correct any errors that may
have been made in the investigator's preparation of the statement and
also insures obtaining a copy of what has been provided to the special
investigator. Absent that, the special investigator may be unwilling to
provide a copy of interview notes or any interview memorandum gener-
ated during the course of the interview.
6. Lawyer Conduct in the Interview
MSHA special investigators expect to conduct the interview them-
selves. Should a circumstance arise in which the witness wishes to confer
with counsel or should the interview be taking an inappropriate direction,
counsel can and should intervene, confer with the witness, and determine
what steps to take. Absent that, the primary role of counsel is to protect
the witness from overreaching, provide clarifying information as appro-
priate, and review the statement with the witness before it is finalized to
assist with clarifications and corrections.
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7. Post-Investigation Statement of Position
Whenever counsel has participated in a special investigation, it is
important to do a post-investigation statement of position to the special
investigator. This will provide both factual and legal argument, together
with other available information mitigating the issuance of any individ-
ual penalties. The letter should request that it be included in the file. It
will provide a statement of position for evaluation by more senior man-
agers of MSHA as MSHA evaluates the file to determine what actions, if
any, to take.
CONCLUSION
Special investigations create especially sensitive problems for min-
ing companies and their managers and counsel. While this article pro-
vides thoughts about the process and steps to evaluate, each special in-
vestigation must be evaluated on its own merits. Careful attention to the
facts of the situation, the presentation of those facts, and the individuals
involved (both from the company and MSHA) is necessary and will in-
variably lead to tailoring the particular approach. "Rules" suggested
herein may often find exception in the unique circumstances of a par-
ticular investigation. Nevertheless, these broad guidelines should provide
counsel with a start to the process.
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